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COMMENTS
THE EFFECT OF ASSET TRANSFERS ON
MEDICAID ELIGIBILITY
Julia Fabula is a seventy-four year-old woman whose monthly
income is $266. She requires nursing home care costing between
$700 and $1000 for each month. Shortly after giving her house
to relatives, Ms. Fabula applied for state assistance to meet the costs
of her medical care. Despite this gratuitous transfer of a resource
that could have been liquidated to help pay for her care, she is
eligible for medical assistance benefits. Ms. Fabula lives in Mary-
land.1
Enosinsio Manahan is a senile, eighty-five year-old man who
has been living in a nursing home since January 1977. He is ex-
pected to require institutional care indefinitely. In May 1977, his
wife sold her house to pay off various debts; Mr. Manahan had a
community property interest in the house. Early in 1978, he ap-
plied for state assistance in meeting the costs of his medical care.
Despite a finding by a state hearing officer that Mr. Manahan
" 'lacked a capacity to transact legal business,' "2 a statutory pre-
sumption that he transferred the property in order to qualify for
state subsidization of his nursing home care makes him ineligible
for state assistance.8 Mr. Manahan lives in California.
4
Ms. Fabula and Mr. Manahan are "medically indigent" or
"medically needy" individuals. Medical indigence differs from
poverty; a medically indigent person has sufficient income and other
resources to meet his or her daily living expenses, but lacks the
funds to pay for necessary medical care.5
Congress recognized the concept of medical indigence in 1965
when it established the cooperative federal-state Medicaid program
1 Fabula v. Buck, 598 F.2d 869, 871-74 (4th Cir. 1979).
2 Brief for Appellants at 8, Dawson v. Myers, 622 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir.), cert.
granted sub nom. Beltran v. Myers, 101 S. Ct 353 (1980). The Court heard oral
argument in this case on March 24, 1981. 49 U.S.L.W. 3683.
sid. 9.
4 See Dawson v. Myers, 622 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir.) (upholding the state's denial
of benefits), cert. denied sub nom. Beltran v. Myers, 101 S. Ct. 353 (1980).
6 For example, the "working poor" who cannot afford health insurance are
often included in this group. See Naliboff & Lang, Expanding Access to Health
Care: Written Eligibility Standards for the Medically Indigent, 13 CLEAuNGHous
REv. 848, 848-49 (1980). Throughout this Comment, the terms "medically needy"
and "medically indigent" will be used interchangeably.
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to assist the poor in meeting the cost of health care.8 States choos-
ing to participate in the Medicaid program have the option of pro-
viding Medicaid benefits to the medically needy.7 Several states
with such programs, however, deny Medicaid to applicants who dis-
pose of assets before application for benefits." In addition, some
state laws have provided for termination of Medicaid benefits to
recipients who transfer assets to prevent the state's recovering the
cost of medical assistance from the recipient's estate after his death.9
Although few cases have been decided in this area, the trend in the
federal courts and in some state courts has been to invalidate these
"transfer of assets" rules by holding that they conflict with federal
law.10 Recently, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
halted this trend by upholding California's transfer of assets rule
in Dawson v. Myers."
The courts' resolutions of the asset transfer issue have been
unsatisfactory. Construing the same statutory and regulatory lan-
guage, they have reached the disparate results illustrated by the
cases of Ms. Fabula and Mr. Manahan. Other courts have manipu-
lated the statutory and regulatory language to reach results that
6Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286
(codified in scattered sections of 26, 42, 45 U.S.C.). See S. 1tP. No. 404, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONo. & An. NEws 1943, 1950;
Naliboff & Lang, supra note 5, at 849 & n.8.
The federal government's share of the cost of Medicaid benefits is based on
the state's per capita income and ranges from 50% to 83%. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b)
(1976).
742 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i) (1976). See text accompanying notes 17-29
infra.
8 See, e.g., CAL. WEL=. & INST. CODE § 14015 (West 1980); MAss. ANN.
LAws ch. 118E, § 13 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1975); PA. STAT. ANN. tit 62, § 441.2
(Pardon Supp. 1980-81).
9E.g., N.Y. Soc. Sanv. LAw §366(1)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1980). The
New York law would deny eligibility even if the transferred asset is one that would
not affect eligibility if the applicant or recipient retained it (for example, the
applicant's home) on the theory that the transfer was made to prevent the state
from recovering the cost of benefits after the recipients death. See also Fabula
v. Buck, in which the court invalidated a Maryland regulation making ineligible
for Medicaid any applicant or recipient who transferred assets in order to circum-
vent the state's recovery procedures. 598 F.2d 869, 871 (4th Cir. 1979).
Federal law places some limitations on a state's recovery from a recipients
estate. States may recover only for benefits supplied to a recipient aged sixty-five
or older. Moreover, states may not recover so long as the recipients spouse or
disabled or minor child is still living. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(18) (1976).
10 See, e.g., Caldwell v. Blum, 621 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1980), petition for cert.
fied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3005 (U.S. June 24, 1980) (No. 79-2034); Fabula v. Buck, 598
F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1979); Scarpuzza v. Blum, 73 A.D.2d 237, 426 N.Y.S.2d 505
(1980).
"1622 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Beltran v. Myers, 101
S. Ct. 353 (1980). See text accompanying notes 45-52 infra. Accord, Lerner v.
Department of Health and Social Servs., 70 Wis. 2d 670, 235 N.W.2d 478 (1975).
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seemed just in the cases before them. 12 Recent federal legislation 13
is equally unsatisfactory because it fails to resolve the conflict il-
lustrated by the cases and thus paves the way for continuing piece-
meal solutions. 14
This Comment focuses on the application of state transfer of
assets rules to the elderly medically indigent.15 Part I, in presenting
the origins and significance of the asset transfer problems, argues
that the states need a method of protecting against abusive asset
transfers because their alternative may be to restrict or eliminate
essential care for the medically needy. The major asset transfer
cases, which pose the basic questions in this area, are discussed in
part II. After proposing in part III a reinterpretation of the fed-
eral statute and regulations at issue in these cases, part IV critically
examines federal legislation recently enacted to deal with the asset
transfer problem. The Comment concludes that, because the re-
cent legislation permits states to create their own asset transfer pol-
icies, but within poorly defined limits, the issue is not yet resolved.
The states must recognize the problems highlighted by the cases
and establish asset transfer policies that strike a reasonable balance
between the needs of Medicaid recipients and the states' concern
for providing benefits to the needy.
I. THE ASSET TRANSFER ISSUE
A. Origins
States choosing to participate in the Medicaid program 1 must
provide benefits to the "categorically needy," those individuals who
12 See notes 102-10 infra & accompanying text.
13 Social Security Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 5, 94 Stat. 3567
(to be codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382b, 1396a).
14 See text accompanying notes 145-77 infra.
16 Most of the cases in the area involve elderly applicants. See, e.g., Fabula
v. Buck, 598 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1979); Scarpuzza v. Blum, 73 A.D.2d 237, 426
N.Y.S.2d 505 (1980); Lerner v. Department of Health and Social Servs., 70 Wis.
2d 670, 235 N.W.2d 478 (1975). Elderly people also are more likely to become
permanent residents of long-term care facilities, see text accompanying notes 37-39
infra, and they may wish to transfer their homes (and other assets) to relatives to
avoid probate. See Brief for Appellants at 6-7, Dawson v. Myers (profile of
plaintiff Dawson who quitclaimed her interest in her home to her grandchildren
because she wanted them to enjoy their "inheritance" before her death).
This Comment does not discuss Medicare, the national health insurance pro-
gram for the elderly, which covers long-term care only for a limited period of time
and only after hospitalization. See Note, Medicare and Medicaid: The Failure
of the Present Health Care System for the Elderly, 17 A=uz. L. REv. 522, 523-26
(1975). The elderly person who needs government assistance to meet the costs
of indefinite or permanent care cannot rely on Medicare.
16 See note 6 supra & accompanying text.
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receive cash payments from the federal or a state government to
cover daily expenses because their incomes and other resources are
insufficient.17 At their option, participating states also may pro-
vide Medicaid benefits to the "medically needy," 18 defined by the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) l9 as "aged,
blind, or disabled individuals or families and children . . . whose
income and resources are above the limits prescribed for the cate-
gorically needy but are within the limits set under the medicaid
State plan." 20 Under a program for the medically needy, these
individuals receive financial assistance, but only for health care
expenses.
21
To qualify as medically needy under current federal regula-
tions, a person must be "linked" to a categorical assistance pro-
gram 22-in other words, bear all the characteristics of a recipient of
cash assistance, except for his or her income and other financial
17 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (1976). Categorically needy persons are
-aged, blind or disabled individuals or families and children ...who meet the
financial eligibility requirements for AFDC [Aid to Families with Dependent
Children], SSI [Supplemental Security Income], or an optional State [cash assist-
ance] supplement." 42 C.F.R. § 435.4 (1979).
The AFDC program is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-611 (1976 & Supp. H
1978). It is a cooperative federal-state program that provides cash assistance
payments
to needy dependent children and the parents or relatives with whom they
are living to help maintain and strengthen family life and to help such
parents or relatives to attain or retain capability for the maximum self-
support and personal independence consistent with the maintenance of
continuing parental care and protection.
42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976).
SSI, a federal program that provides cash payments to the aged, blind, and
disabled, is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383c (1976 & Supp. II 1978). It was
enacted in 1972 to replace the three previously existing
[sltate-administered programs of assistance to the aged, blind, and disabled
with one combined adult assistance program which would be Federally
administered by the Social Security Administration and would have
nationally uniform requirements for such eligibility factors as the level
and type of resources allowed and the degree of disability or blindness.
H.R. llp. No. 231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4989, 4992.
1842 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i) (1976).
19 The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) was redesig-
nated the Department of Health and Human Services by the Department of
Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 509, 93 Stat. 668 (codified at
20 U.S.C. § 3508 (Supp. I1 1979)). The change became effective May 4, 1980.
45 Fed. Beg. 29,642 (1980). This Comment will use the acronym "HHS"
throughout, including references to actions by HEW before the name change.
20 42 C.F.R. § 435.4 (1979).
2142 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i) (1976). The assistance received under
Medicaid is not direct cash reimbursement, but payment to the provider of medical
services.
2 2 Checking the Legality of Your State's Medically Needy Income Levels, 13
,CLEAunGHOUSE REv. 755, 757 (1980).
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resources. Thus, medically needy families must have the same non-
financial characteristics as recipients of cash payments under the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program,2 and
medically needy individuals must be aged, blind, or disabled-the
nonfinancial characteristics of recipients of cash payments under
the federal Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program.
24
SSI recipients are among the categorically needy who must be
covered by states participating in the Medicaid program.2m Prior
to a 1980 amendment to the SSI program 26 SSI applicants were
expressly permitted to transfer resources that, if retained, would
have made them ineligible to receive cash assistance.27 Resources
could be given away or sold for less than adequate consideration 28
without precluding eligibility for SSI.29 The divergence between
this federal rule and several state rules denying Medicaid benefits
to medically needy persons who divested themselves of assets prior
to application for benefits gave rise to litigation that has split the
courts 30 and culminated in the 1980 legislative attempt to solve the
problem.31
The meager cash payments distributed under the SSI pro-
gram provide little incentive to divest oneself of substantial assets
merely to receive SSI benefits. 2 In contrast, because the potential
23This means that there must be a qualifying dependent child in the family.
42 C.F.R. § 435.310 (1979). See note 17 supra.
2442 C.F.R. §§ 435.320-.325 (1979). See note 17 supra.
242 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A) (1976). One option in the Medicaid statute
does permit states to cover fewer than all SSI recipients, provided the state does
not use requirements that are more restrictive than those in effect in January 1972.
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(f) (1976). This is the so-called "209(b)" option, added by
the Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 209(b), 86 Stat.
1329. For a discussion of the 209(b) option, see Norman v. St. Clair, 610 F.2d
1228, 1231-32 (5th Cir. 1980), petition for cert. fled sub nom. Harris v. Norman,
49 U.S.L.W. 3271 (U.S. Sept. 27, 1980) (No. 80-498). See note 43 infra.
26 Soial Security Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 5(a), 94 Stat.
3567 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1382b). The new SSI rule became effective
March 1, 1981, "the first day of the first month which [began] at least 60 days
after the enactment of this Act." Id. § 5(c).
2742 U.S.C. § 1382b(b) (1976); 42 C.F.R. §435.120(b) (1979).
2 SAdequate consideration is generally interpreted as fair market value. See
H.R. REP. No. 1167, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1980).
29 SocU. SECUTRY AD., DE"T or ALTH am Hum" SExvicns, Socmi.
SEcui Ty CLAims MANUA.L § 12507(a) (1977) [hereinafter cited as SocmxL
SEcURvT CLAIMS MANUAL].
30 See notes 10 & 11 supra & accompanying text.
31 Social Security Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 5(a), 94 Stat.
3567 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1382b).
32 Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 24, Caldwell v. Blum, 621 F.2d 491 (2d
Cir.), petition for cert. fled, 49 U.S.L.W. 3005 (U.S. June 24, 1980) (No.
79-2034). SSI benefits to an eligible individual were payable at the rate of $146
per month between July 1, 1974, and June 30, 1975, and at the rate of $157.70
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cost of long-term institutional care is huge, the temptation to trans-
fer assets in order to receive Medicaid benefits may be very real.
The Senate report accompanying an unenacted 1979 bill observed
that
[w]here an individual with significant assets is faced
with the prospect of substantial medical expenses-par-
ticularly in cases where a prolonged period of institu-
tionalization may be needed-present law may provide a
strong incentive for him to give those assets away to a
friend or relative so as to qualify for medicaid immedi-
ately. To the extent that this happens, the costs of the
program are increased since medical expenses which could
be met from the individual's assets are instead being paid
for by public funds.33
The new legislation is not likely to change these incentives.
Although the legislation places restrictions on asset transfers by
SSI applicants and gives states some flexibility in creating their
own policies affecting medically needy Medicaid applicants, it does
not alter the benefits received. The dilemma remains-the creation
of an asset transfer rule that both accommodates the states' con-
cerns and protects deserving applicants.
B. Significance
The difficulties in meeting the long-term health care needs of
the elderly population are for several reasons likely to intensify in
the near future.3 4 First, the elderly population is increasing. One
commentator has noted that
[i]n 1977, 23.5 million people-one in every nine per-
sons in the United States-were sixty-five years of age or
older. By 2010, when the "baby boom" children are
only beginning to reach age sixty-five, the number of
elderly persons in this country is expected to be thirty-
thereafter. 20 C.F.R. § 416.410 (1980). Cost-of-living adjustments may be made,
id. § 416.405, but the amount of cash an individual actually receives is reduced by
his nonexcludable income, id. § 416.410. Examples of excludable income are
benefits provided under another federal program, state cash assistance based on
need, disaster relief assistance, and limited amounts of earned income. 45 Fed.
Reg. 65,549-50 (1980) (to be codified in 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1112-.1124).
.33S. REP. No. 471, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 48-49 (1979). See also Brief for
Appellees at 16, Dawson v. Myers, 622 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub
nom. Beltran v. Myers, 101 S. Ct. 353 (1980).
84 See generally Comment, Continuing-Care Communities for the Elderly:
potential Pitfalls and Proposed Regulation, 128 U. PA. L. EEv. 883 (1980).
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four million. That number is expected to reach fifty-two
million by 2030, at which time the proportion of our pop-
ulace over sixty-five should peak at somewhere between
fourteen and twenty-two percent.85
Second, the cost of health care is increasing dramatically, approach-
ing ten percent of the gross national product.36 Third, for at least
some elderly individuals with chronic ill health, entry into a long-
term care facility represents more than an arrangement for medical
or nursing care-it represents an indefinite and perhaps permanent
living situation.
37
An elderly person's desire to give his house or other assets ac-
cumulated during his lifetime to his children is understandable.
Using his assets to pay for health care may defeat his lifelong plans.
The states' concerns, however, must also be recognized. Hospital
and long-term care services currently represent two-thirds of Medi-
caid benefits costs.33 The aged, blind, and disabled, who are most
likely to need these services, account for approximately sixty-four
percent of Medicaid expenditures.3 9 It is neither unreasonable
nor unjust to expect that an individual's assets will help defray
35 Id. 883 (footnotes omitted).
s6 U.S. NEws AND WORLD REPORT, Sept. 1, 1980, at 44.
In addition to the increasing cost of medical care generally, studies have re-
vealed a shortage of facilities for the elderly who need institutional care. For
example, the vast majority of long-term care beds in the New York City area In
1977 was occupied by individuals seventy-five years of age or older. HwEALT
SysTsMs AGENCY OF NEW YoRx Crry, ACUTE CARE HosPrrAL REPORT G-61
(1980). The size of the population over age 75 in New York City is expected to
increase from 382,726 in 1977 to 403,984 by 1984. Id. G-75. Patients in acute
care hospitals who need to be transferred to long-term care facilities already out-
number the available beds. Id. G-26. The shortage will continue; between 1,315
and 2,115 additional beds will be required to meet the shortfall projected for long-
term care requirements in 1981. Id. G-33. Similarly, in southeastern Penn-
sylvania, the number of elderly persons eligible for Medicaid who could not be
placed in long-term care facilities in 1979 greatly exceeded the number of non-
elderly persons eligible for Medicaid who also could not be placed. HEALTH
SYSTEMS AGENCY OF SouTHEAsmms PENNSYLVANA, SUPPLEMNT To THE PROPOSED
HEALTH SYSTEMS PLAN: DATA AND REFERENCE MATERIA.S A-LT 1-9, A-LT 7-2
(1980).
Other serious problems that beset the elderly include overutilization of insti-
tutional care due to the lack of noninstitutional alternatives, see Butler, Financing
Noninstitutional Long-Term Care Services for the Elderly and Chronically Ill:
Alternatives to Nursing Homes, 13 CLEARNGHOUSE REv. 335, 336 (1979) (estimat-
ing that between 10% and 40% of institutionalized elderly persons are inappropriately
placed), and woefully inadequate, frequently abusive, institutional care, see M.
MENDELSON, TENDER LoviN CREED (1974).
3 7 See HEALTH SYSrEms AGENCY OF NEw YoRn CrTy, AcUTE CARE HosprrAL
REPORT G-46 (1980); Brief for Appellants at 8, Dawson v. Myers.
38 [1979-1 Transfer Binder] MEDxcamE AND MEDICAD GUmE (CCH) ff 29,592.
39 Id.
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the cost of what may become a permanent living arrangement.
Nevertheless, several of the cases invalidating state asset transfer
rules indicate that the existence of a sympathetic applicant may
unduly influence the results. 4
0
It is important to look beyond appealing facts to the larger is-
sues presented by the cases and to acknowledge that the states' legiti-
mate concern for preventing fraud and abuse must be accommo-
dated. States are under no obligation to provide Medicaid coverage
for the medically needy; 41 at present, eighteen states have no cover-
age, while others have elected to use eligibility requirements for all
Medicaid recipients that are more restrictive than SSI require-
ments. 42 Although Congress's decision to permit the states to im-
pose asset transfer rules is preferable to the likely alternative-re-
striction or complete termination of Medicaid coverage by the
states 43-the states' rules must be structured and applied to guard
40 See notes 102-07 infra & accompanying text.
4142 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i) (1976).
42 States excluding the medically needy from coverage under their Medicaid
programs include: Alabama, [1980] 3 MEnxcAm AND MEDcA GumE (CCH)
1115,550; Alaska, id. f15,552; Colorado, id. 1115,564; Delaware, id. 11 15,568;
Florida, id. 1 15,572; Georgia, id. ff 15,574; Iowa, id. f 15,586; New Jersey, id.
11 15,616; New Mexico, id. 115,618; Ohio, id. 11 15,626; South Carolina, id.
ff 15,638; South Dakota, id. 1 15,640; Texas, id. f[ 15,644; Wyoming, id. 1 15,660;
Idaho, [1979] 3 MEDICARE AND MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 1115,580; Indiana, id.
1f 15,584; Missouri, id. 1 15,606; and Nevada, id. 1 15,612. For a list of states
using eligibility requirements that are more restrictive than those for SSI, see note
43 infra.
43 See Medically Needy Levels for Aged, Blind and Disabled Are Often
Illogically Low and Should Be Challenged, 13 CLEAuNGiHOUSE REv. 599 (1979).
New York, in response to the court decisions invalidating its transfer of assets
rule, Caldwell v. Blum, 621 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1980), petition for cert. fled, 49
U.S.L.W. 3005 (U.S. June 24, 1980) (No. 79-2034), and Scarpuzza v. Blum, 73
A.D.2d 237, 426 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1980), has exercised its option under the federal
Medicaid statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(f) (1976) (the "209(b) option"), to evaluate
Medicaid applicants by using resource eligibility requirements that are more re-
strictive than those under SSL One New York legal services organization estimates
that as many as 20% of SSI recipients have lost Medicaid eligibility in other states
when the 209(b) option has been exercised. 6 GULP Newsletter 3 (Sept. 1980)
(published by Greater Upstate Law Project, Rochester, New York). See note
25 supra.
Besides New York, 209(b) states include: Connecticut, [1980] 3 MEDiCARE
AND MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 115,566; Hawaii, id. 115,578; Illinois, id. 115,582;
Indiana, id. 1f 15,584; Minnesota, id. 1[ 15,602; Mississippi, id. 11 15,604; Nebraska,
id. 1 15,610; New Hampshire, id. 1f 15,612; North Carolina, id. 1 15,622; North
Dakota, id. 1f 15,624; Ohio, id. 1[ 15,626; Utah, id. 1 15,646; Virginia, id. 1[ 15,652;
and Missouri, [1979] 3 MEDICAPE AND MEDICAID GUmE (CCH) 1f 15,606.
Of the states providing medically needy coverage and ostensibly using SSI
eligibility criteria, several had asset transfer rules even before federal law
authorized such rules. These states include: California, CAL. Wz. & INsT. CODE
§ 14015 (West 1980); Massachusetts, MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 118E, § 13 (Michie/
Law. Co-op 1975); Michigan, Interview with Robert Rosenberg, Michigan Attorney
General's Office (Jan. 8, 1981) (applied as an administrative policy); Pennsylvania,
PA. STAT: ANN. tit. 62, §441.2 (Purdon Supp. 1980); Tennessee, TENN. CODE
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against the unjust denial of essential Medicaid benefits to indi-
viduals who cannot control the distribution of their "assets."44
II. ASSET TRANSFER RuLEs AND THE COURTS
A. Conflicting Statutory Interpretations
Actions brought by medically needy Medicaid applicants chal-
lenging state transfer of assets rules have divided the courts of ap-
peals. Dawson v. Myers,45 for example, was a class action attack
on California's asset transfer rule.40 Under that rule an applicant
for Medi-Cal 47 transferring assets for inadequate consideration
within two years before application is ineligible for benefits, unless
he can rebut the presumption that he made the transfer to establish
eligibility or to reduce his share of medical costs.48
The district court hearing the case granted the State of Cali-
fornia's motion for summary judgment.49 The Ninth Circuit af-
firmed, holding that the California statute and implementing regu-
lations do not conflict with federal statutes or regulations,50 do not
ANN. § 14-23-118 (1980); and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. §49.47(4)(d) (West
Supp. 1980).
A federal district court has ruled that the Massachusetts statute conflicts with
federal law. Robinson v. Pratt, No. 79-1278-S (D. Mass. June 24, 1980). At
first, however, the court refused to enjoin enforcement of the statute, stating that
the proper remedy would be for the secretary of -HS to withhold federal payments
from the Massachusetts Medicaid program. Id. The same judge has since issued
a preliminary injunction requiring HHS to withhold funds and commence pro-
ceedings against the state. Robinson v. Pratt, No. 79-1278-S (D. Mass. Sept.
18, 1980).
An interesting contrast to the Massachusetts transfer of assets rule is a pro-
vision recently enacted by the Massachusetts legislature establishing a scheme to
aid the mentally retarded in transferring funds into trusts so that they may become
eligible for Medicaid or SSL 1980 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv. ch. 329, § 45.
44 See notes 172-76 infra & accompanying text.
45622 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Beltran v. Myers, 101
S. Ct. 353 (1980). This case created the circuit split on the question whether
asset transfer rules conflicted with federal law.
46 CAL. WEre. & INST. CODE § 14015 (West 1980).
47 California's Medicaid program is called "Medi-Cal." The terms "Medicaid"
and "Medi-Cal" will be used interchangeably to refer to the California program.
48 22 CAL. AD. CODE § 50409, quoted in Brief for Appellees at 7-8, Dawson v.
Myers, 622 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Beltran v. Myers, 101
S. Ct. 353 (1980). The regulation establishes that only objective facts may be
used to rebut the presumption. Statements of subjective intent, such as intent to
avoid probate or lack of knowledge concerning the availability of Medi-Cal ben-
efits, are not relevant. Objective facts include "evidence that adequate resources
were available at the time of the transfer of property for support and medical care
considering such things as the applicant's or beneficiary's age, health, life ex-
pectancy, and ability to understand extent of resources." Id. § 50409(b) (2).
49 Dawson v. Beach, No. CV-78-2350-MML (C.D. Cal. May 10, 1979).
50622 F.2d at 1312-14. See notes 62-64 infra for the text of the applicable
federal statutes and regulations.
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deny the applicants due process of law,51 and do not violate the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.
2
Similarly, Caldwell v. Blum 53 involved a class action challenge
to New York's asset transfer rule by elderly medically needy indi-
viduals residing in that state. The New York law presumed that a
transfer of any property within eighteen months prior to applica-
tion for Medicaid benefits was made for the purpose of qualifying
for benefits. 4 Certain items of property, such as a homestead and
essential personal property, were not counted in determining an
applicant's eligibility for benefits.55 If an applicant transferred
even that exempt property for inadequate consideration within
eighteen months before application or at any time after application,
however, he was presumed to have done so "for the purpose of de-
feating any current or future right to recovery of medical assistance
paid, or for the purpose of qualifying for, continuing eligibility
for or increasing need for medical assistance." 56 The applicant
had the burden of proving to a social services official that the trans-
fer was not made for the proscribed purpose.
57
The district court granted a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of the New York statute and implementing regula-
tions.58 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on the
ground that the New York law conflicted with the federal statue
and HHS regulations.5 9
The conflict between the two circuits revolves primarily
around two provisions of subchapter XIX of the Social Security
51622 F.2d at 1314.
52 Id. 1315.
53 621 F.2d 491 (2d Cir.), petition for cert. fled, 49 U.S.L.W. 3005 (U.S.
June 24, 1980) (No. 79-2034).
54 N.Y. Soc. Smv. LAw §366(1)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
55 Id. §366(2)(a) (MeKinney 1976 & Supp. 1980).
56 Id. §366(1)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
57 18 N.Y. CODE R. & .EG. § 360.8 (1978). The New York regulations re-
quire only proof "to the satisfaction of the social services official," id. Cf. note 48
supra (use of objective facts required in California).
5S Caldwell v. Blum, No. 78-CV-569 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1979).
59 621 F.2d at 497-98. See notes 62-64 infra for the text of the applicable
federal statutes and regulations.
The United States Supreme Court has twice refused to stay the Second
Circuit's order in Caidwell. In a short opinion announced prior to the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Dawson, Justice Marshall refused New York's request to stay
the injunction, declaring that the state had failed to meet its twin burdens of
proving both irreparable harm and the likelihood that four members of the
Supreme Court would vote to grant certiorari. Blum v. Caldwell, 100 S. Ct. 1635
(Marshall, Circuit Justice, 1980). A second request was denied by the full Court,
without opinion. Blum v. Caldwell, 100 S. Ct. 2959 (1980). A petition for
certiorari has nevertheless been filed. Caldwell v. Blum, 49 U.S.L.W. 3005 (U.S.
June 24, 1980) (No. 79-2034).
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Act 6 0 and an HHS implementing regulation."' The first statutory
section, or comparability provision, requires that a state electing
to cover the medically needy furnish medical assistance to all indi-
viduals who, but for their incomes and other resources, would be
considered categorically needy, yet who have insufficient funds to
meet their medical costs. The insufficiency of incomes and re-
sources is to be evaluated "in accordance with comparable stand-
ards." 62 The second troublesome section, or availability provision,
requires that a state Medicaid plan take into account only the in-
come and resources that are "available to the applicant." 63 The
disputed HHS regulation (subsection 401(c)) requires that state
plans not use eligibility requirements for the medically needy aged,
blind, and disabled that are more restrictive than those used under
the SSI program.64
The Caldwell court relied on the comparability provision 05
to reach its holding that New York's imposition of "'more restrictive
eligibility requirements on the medically needy than on the cate-
60 Subchapter XIX is the Medicaid statute, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-
1396k (1976 & Supp. II 1978).
6142 C.F.R. §435.401(c) (1979).
62Under the statute, a state plan for the medically needy must provide
for making medical assistance available to all individuals who would,
except for income and resources, be eligible for aid or assistance under
any such State plan or to have paid with respect to them supplemental
security income benefits under subchapter XVI of this chapter, and who
have insufficient (as determined in accordance with comparable standards)
income and resources to meet the costs of necessary medical and remedial
care and services.
42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(10)(C)(i) (1976) (emphasis added).
63 The statute requires the state to
include reasonable standards . . . for determining eligibility for and the
extent of medical assistance under the plan which . . . provide for taking
into account only such income and resources as are, as determined in
accordance with standards prescribed by the Secretary, available to the
applicant or recipient and ... as would not be disregarded (or set aside
for future needs) in determining his eligibility for [a cash assistance
program].
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1976) (emphasis added).
64 The regulation reads:
The agency must not use requirements for determining eligibility for
optional coverage groups that are-
(1) For families and children, more restrictive than those used under
the State's AFDC plan; and
(2) For aged, blind, and disabled individuals, more restrictive than
those used under SSI, except for individuals receiving an optional State
supplement as specified in § 435.230 or individuals in categories specified
by the agency under § 435.121.
42 C.F.R. § 435A01(c) (1979) (emphasis added).
65 Caldwell v. Blum, 621 F.2d at 495-96.
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gorically needy" 66 justified a preliminary injunction against en-
forcement of the state's rule.67  It rejected the state's argument,
based on congressional committee reports accompanying the original
Medicaid legislation,68 that the comparability provision was in-
tended to assure comparable treatment among only the various
medically needy groups-the aged, blind, disabled, and families and
children-rather than between the medically needy and the cate-
gorically needy. Conceding that "the State's argument is not with-
out some force," 69 the court nevertheless dismissed it and declared
that because "the aged, blind and disabled medically needy must be
treated comparably as between each other does not mean that as a
group (the medically needy) they should not be treated comparably
with the categorically needy." 70 It found support for this conclu-
sion in the HHS subsection 401(c) regulation and noted that HHS
"has promulgated a number of regulations on comparability . . .
which have been invariably upheld by the court." 71 The court
also quoted the availability provision, noting that it "buttressed" 72
the applicants' argument and concluding that "'for persons such
as plaintiffs ... state standards must provide that income which is
disregarded in determining SSI eligibility also be disregarded in
determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance
under Medicaid.' "73
66 Id. 494.
67Id. 498-99.
68 The legislative history quoted in the opinion reads:
The committee bill would make more specific a provision now in the
law that in determining eligibility for and the extent of aid under the
plan, States must use reasonable standards consistent with the objectives
of the titles. Although States may set a limitation on income and resources
which individuals may hold and be eligible for aid, they must do so by
maintaining a comparability among the various categorical groups of
needy people. Whatever level of financial eligibility the State determines
to be that which is applicable for the eligibility of the needy aged, for
example, shall be comparable to that which the State sets to determine
the eligibility for the needy blind and disabled; and must also have a
comparability to the standards used to determine the eligibility of those
who are to receive medical assistance as needy children and the parents
or other relatives caring for them.
S. RnP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 77-78, reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 1943, 2018.
69 621 F.2d at 497.
70 Id.
71 Id. 497 & n.8 (footnote omitted).
72 Id. 496.
73Id. (quoting Friedman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724, 728 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 984 (1977)). In Friedman, the Second Circuit rejected a suit
by institutionalized medically needy plaintiffs seeking to invalidate a New York
regulation that restricted the amount of income they could retain to $28.50 per
month. The court found that there was comparable treatment between the
medically and categorically needy.
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The Ninth Circuit, construing the same statute and regula-
tion in Dawson, reached the opposite conclusion. It disposed of the
comparability provision by dividing it into two parts:
The first part specifically excepts income and re-
sources when it equates SSI eligibility to the medically
needy eligibility requirements. And so, while this provi-
sion does extend all of the SSI eligibility requirements to
the medically needy, it does not do so for those which deal
with the applicant's income and resources. Were this not
the case, then there would be no distinction between the
two groups.74
The second part of the comparability provision, according to the
court, "only requires the standards to be comparable, not identical.
.. . The [standards other than the asset transfer rule] which are
used for determining financial eligibility are similar enough to
invite comparison." 75
In rejecting the applicants' argument that the California stat-
ute conflicts with the availability provision of the federal statute,
the court refused to define "availability" literally by equating it
with "present record title or ownership." 76 The court found sup-
port for this interpretation in an HHS regulation allowing states
to consider income for a six-month prospective period when de-
termining eligibility. 77 Because the regulation permits evaluation
of future income, the court concluded that a state "should also be
allowed to consider those assets which have been recently disposed
of under circumstances which indicate that the purpose was to
qualify for public medical assistance." 78
The unique element of the Dawson court's approach was its
close look at the relevant HHS regulations. Other courts 79 have
relied primarily on the subsection 401(c) regulation requiring a
74 Dawson v. Myers, 622 F.2d at 1310-11 (emphasis in original).
75 Id. 1311.
76 Id. 1312.
77Id. 1313. The regulation cited by the court states: "The agency must
determine income eligibility of medically needy individuals in accordance with this
section. The agency must use a prospective period of not more than 6 months to
compute income." 45 Fed. Beg. 24,886 (1980) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R.
§ 435.831).
78 622 F.2d at 1313. It does not follow logically that permission to consider
assets retroactively is necessarily implicit in a regulation permitting consideration of
future income. On the contrary, there is a difference between resources that have
been disposed of and income that is still coming in.
79 E.g., Caldwell, 621 F.2d at 495; Fabula v. Buck, 598 F.2d 869, 872-73
(4th Cir. 1979); Scarpuzza v. Blum, 73 A.D.2d 237, 247, 426 N.Y.S.2d 505, 512
(1980).
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state to use no more restrictive eligibility requirements for the
medically needy than for the categorically needy.80 In its discus-
sion, the Dawson court first noted that to read the regulation the
way the applicants did "would be [to read] an inconsistency into
the federal statutory and regulatory framework. The Medicaid
program is designed to provide benefits to two differently situated
groups .... By definition, different financial requirements apply
to the medically needy than to the categorically needy." 81 The
second and more persuasive point made by the court was that the
subsection 401(c) regulation, upon which the applicants and other
courts relied so heavily, is one of a group of HHS regulations
establishing general eligibility requirements: 82 "There is absolutely
no discussion of financial eligibility requirements in any of the
other sections of this subpart. Instead, the focus of all of the sec-
tions is directed toward much more general concerns, such as eligi-
bility requirements which are based on citizenship, alienage, or state
residence." 83 Without discussing them, the court noted that three
other subparts of the regulations describe the financial eligibility
requirements. It declared that these specific regulations, which
establish rules for evaluating the resources of a medically needy
applicant,84 supersede the more general eligibility rules.8
The Dawson and CaIdwell courts both discussed a series of
letters, written by HHS regional directors to state officials in New
York and Michigan and to a legal services program in California,
stating that asset transfer rules are invalid as applied to the med-
ically needy.88 The Caldwell court accorded some weight to these
letters 87 and deferred to the HHS interpretation of the statute38
But the Dawson court, while recognizing the principle that a "court
generally defers to an administrative agency's interpretation of the
80 For text of the regulation, see note 64 supra.
81622 F.2d at 1313 (emphasis in original).
821d. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.400-.404 (1979).
ss 622 F.2d at 1313.
84See text accompanying notes 132-38 infra; 42 C.F.R. § 435.845 (1979); 45
Fed. Reg. 24,886 (1980) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 435.845(e)).
85 622 F.2d at 1313-14. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.800-.845 (1979); 45 Fed. Reg.
24,886 (1980) (to be codified in 42 C.F.R. § 435.845(e)).
8The Fabula court also discussed these letters. 598 F.2d at 873 & n.10.
87 621 F.2d at 495. In addition to noting the letters, the district court opinion
in Caldwell pointed out that "in the [HHS] Compliance Report for the quarter
ending June 30, 1978, New York State was officially cited as being out of com-
pliance with federal requirements on the same basis:" Caldwell v. Blum, No.
78-CV-569, slip op. at 11 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 1979).
88 621 F.2d at 497. The Fabula court also deferred to HHS. 598 F.2d at 873.
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law which it is charged with administering," 89 refused to defer to
the HHS interpretation in this case. The court immediately fol-
lowed this refusal with a summary rejection of the HHS letters,
stating that HHS "as a whole has approved California's Medi-Cal
program (and the transfer rule) . .. [N]ot only do we believe
that the letter rulings should not be followed, but we also believe
that [HHS's] general acceptance of California's Medi-Cal program
supports our interpretation." e0
The Dawson court's reliance on HHS's general approval of an
entire program in the face of the agency's very specific letters to
the contrary is at best contrived. A better view is that such general
approval of a state plan "is not more than slightly persuasive
when, as here, the so-called approval does not appear to have
followed explicit attention to the question now confronted." 91 The
Dawson court wished to reject the HHS interpretation of the statute
and did so. In view of the HHS letters, the Ninth Circuit's effort
to find support for that rejection in HHS's casual approval of the
entire California program is questionable.
92
89 622 F.2d at 1311. See New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413
U.S. 405, 421 (1973) (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
381 (1969)).
90 622 F.2d at 1311. The court made this statement despite extensive argu-
ment in appellants' brief, which included the text of one of the letters and a
discussion of the Fabula court's treatment of the issue. Brief for Appellants at
15-17, Dawson v. Myers.
91 Fabula, 598 F.2d at 873 n.11 (quoting Aitchison v. Berger, 404 F. Supp.
1137, 1148 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd mere., 538 F.2d 307 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 890 (1976)). See also Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1970).
9 2AFDC eligibility cases and the literature concerning them have established
that "state determinations as to need and level of benefits are given far greater
latitude than regulations concerning eligibility." Block, Cooperative Federalism
and the Role of Litigation in the Development of Federal AFDC Eligibility Policy,
1979 Wis. L. REv. 1, 2 (1979) (emphasis added).
The leading cases invalidating state rules that restricted AFDC eligibility are
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (Alabama regulation denying AFDC payments
to children of a woman who cohabited with an able-bodied man invalidated under
supremacy clause because Congress intended "parent" to mean only those with
a legal duty to support a child), Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971)
(Illinois statute denying AFDC payments to eighteen to twenty year-old college
students invalidated because the Social Security Act's definition of a dependent child
included college students in that age group), and Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S.
598, 602 (1972) (California regulation denying AFDC payments to needy families
when a parent was absent for military service invalidated because the federal
eligibility criterion requiring a parent to be absent from the home "accurately
describe[d] a parent on active military duty").
Using these AFDC eligibility cases, the applicants in Dawson argued that
"states are not permitted to deprive otherwise eligible individuals of benefits by
the use of restrictive eligibility criteria which are not included in the federal
legislation." Brief for Appellants at 22, Dawson v. Myers. In a conclusory foot-
note the court rejected this argument, stating that it was "unable to find any
provision of the statute which said this." 622 F.2d at 1310 n.8.
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Equally unsatisfactory is the Caldwell court's discussion of the
legislative history. In rejecting New York's argument that the sole
purpose of the comparability provision was to assure comparable
treatment among the various groups of medically needy people,
93
the court thought more highly of subsequent legislative interpreta-
tions than of contemporaneous legislative history. 4 Attempts to
amend the Social Security Act to explicitly authorize state imposi-
tion of asset transfer rules,95 with the attendant implication that the
The Dawson court did not discuss any of the aforementioned AFDC cases.
Instead, it relied on a later ease, New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413
U.S. 405, 413 (1973), to support its conclusion that, because of the cooperative
federal-state nature of the Medicaid program, it would be inappropriate to
invalidate an eligibility requirement that Congress had failed to prohibit in the
Medicaid statute. 622 F.2d at 1310 n.8.
The Fabula court, on the other hand, cited Townsend to support its conclusion
that Maryland could not use an eligibility requirement that was more restrictive
than the federal requirements. Fabula, 598 F.2d at 873.
See Comment, HEWs Power to Grant AFDC Benefits to Technically In-
eligible Individuals, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1359 (1976), for an exhaustive discussion
of the King, Townsend, and Remillard cases. The Comment notes the "well-
settled principle that [HHS] may not accept a state plan that excludes from
coverage persons who are eligible for AFDC under federal standards unless the
exclusion is permitted by the Act itself." Id. 1359-60. It argues that the Court's
"leniency" to state rules in Dublino "must be viewed in light of its remanding the
case to determine whether the state work rules did in fact 'contravene the purposes
or provisions of [the federal statute]."' Id. 1372-73 n.96 (quoting Dublino, 413
U.S. at 423).
More recently, however, it has been suggested that the King, Townsend, and
Remillard cases have been read in an "overly broad manner." Block, Cooperative
Federalism and the Role of Litigation in the Development of Federal AFDC
Eligibility Policy, 1979 Wis. L. REv. 1, 17 (1979). See also Burns v. Alcala, 420
U.S. 575, 580 (1975).
The result, although not the reasoning, of Townsend has been overruled by
a recent statute. Social Security Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 4,
94 Stat. 3567 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. §606(a)(2)) (giving states the
option to provide AFDC benefits only to students aged eighteen to twenty-one who
are in high school or are participating in vocational training).
93 See note 68 supra and text accompanying notes 68-70 supra.
94 621 F.2d at 497-98. See text accompanying notes 97 & 98 infra.
95A report written to accompany H.R. 934, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979),
states in part:
The bill permits States to deny medical assistance to any aged,
blind, or disabled person (including individuals who are not "categorically
ineligible") who has given away assets in order to meet the medicaid
eligibility requirements (or has "sold" such assets for less than their
fair market value).
The bill would allow States the option of denying or limiting
eligibility in this type of situation. If a State chooses to make use of this
provision, an aged, blind, or disabled person would be considered (for
purposes of medicaid eligibility) to still possess a disposed-of asset for
a period of 12 months if he gave it away in order to become eligible for
medicaid.
S. RLs. No. 471, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 48-49 (1979). See also S. REP. No. 1111,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (1978).
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Act had not previously authorized such restrictions, tended to con-
firm to the court the HHS interpretation of the statute.96
Using legislative history in this manner is dubious. Indeed,
the same court in an earlier case declared that "pronouncements by
a subsequent Congress are not entitled to the same weight as those
of the Congress which enacted a measure." 97 The Supreme Court
has expressed similar sentiments regarding subsequent legislative
history.98
B. Fraud Prevention Versus Legitimate Need
Neither the Dawson decision, which would permit all restric-
tions on asset transfers, nor the Caldwell decision, which would
prohibit all asset transfer rules, is satisfactory from a policy stand-
point. Both fail to resolve the basic conflict highlighted by the
cases themselves. The states have legitimate arguments for restrict-
ing the transfer of any resources by Medicaid applicants, even those
resources excluded in eligibility determinations.99 The state rules
not only express concern that eligibility for benefits may be fraudu-
lently obtained, but also reflect the states' desire to recover the cost
of Medicaid benefits out of the recipient's estate after he or she
dies.100  These goals are not unreasonable. They should be met,
however, so that those who truly need medical assistance are not
denied benefits when there is clearly neither fraud nor an intent
to cheat the state out of its recovery.
In some of the cases in which state transfer of assets rules have
been challenged, variations in statutory and regulatory construc-
tion and in the degree of deference to state concerns intimate that
considerations of equity may be guiding the courts. The cases
recognize, some explicitly,' 0 ' that efforts to prevent fraud and abuse
underlie the state statutes. The courts have attempted to har-
monize that statutory intent with the needs of deserving applicants
against whom asset transfer rules have been applied unfairly.
96 621 F.2d at 497-98.
9 7Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 175 (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
98 See, e.g., United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960). But see Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969).
9 9 See text accompanying note 55 supra.
100 See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SE-v. LAW § 366(1)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
101 See, e.g., Buckner v. Maher, 424 F. Supp. 366, 373 (D. Conn. 1976),
aft'd, 434 U.S. 898 (1977); Lerner v. Department of Health and Social Servs., 70
Wis. 2d 670, 680, 235 N.W.2d 478, 483 (1975).
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For example, in Buckner v. Maker,02 a class action in which
a federal district court invalidated Connecticut's transfer of assets
rule, the court repeatedly emphasized that the state made no allega-
dons of fraud against any of the applicants.0 3  The state argued
only that a transfer of resources within seven years of application
for benefits, in violation of the state statute, justified denial of those
benefits.10 4 One of the applicants, an eighty-six year-old man, had
sold his home for $34,000. During the next three years, that sum
was "frittered away in numerous small transactions, under circum-
stances which suggest that he was the victim of individuals who
took advantage of his gullibility and reduced mental capacity to
divest him of his holdings." 105 If the court had upheld the Con-
necticut statute and regulations, he would have remained ineligible
for Medicaid benefits for more than eight years.1 6 A second ap-
plicant, an eighty year-old man, transferred his interest in his house
to his daughter in exchange for $5,000 ten years after she had
begun living with him, caring for him and the house, and paying
taxes on the house. He was denied Medicaid benefits because of
the state's determination-without accounting for the daughter's
non-pecuniary contribution-that the true value of his interest in
the house was $11,843. He also would have remained ineligible for
benefits for several years.
10 7
102424 F. Supp. 366 (D. Conn. 1976), aff'd, 434 U.S. 898 (1977). The
court found that the Connecticut rule conflicted with the availability provision of
the federal statute, rather than with the comparability provision. Id. 373-74. See
notes 63-65 supra & accompanying text for a discussion of the two provisions.
Because Buckner was summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court, it has precedential
value. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975). See C. WRiGHT, HANDBOOn oF
T LAw OF FEDERAL CounTs § 108 (3d ed. 1976).
In Caldwell, 621 F.2d 491, the court did not even cite the Buckner decision.
In Dawson, the court cited Buckner only to "recognize that the majority of the
courts which have been faced with similar challenges have reached the opposite
conclusion." 622 F.2d at 1315.
103 424 F. Supp. at 371, 373.
104 Id. 371-72.
105 Id. 371.
l6 Id.
107 Id. 370. Under the Connecticut scheme, benefits were denied for whatever
period of time the value of the transferred asset would have paid the individual's
expenses.
Although the court insisted that the basis for its decision was conflict with
federal law and not the unreasonable nature of the Connecticut rule, the opinion
suggests that the cruelty with which the rule operated against the applicants in
this case strongly influenced the case's outcome:
This court finds that the Connecticut rule has the effect, if not the avowed
intent, of presuming that transferred assets are still available to the
transferor. In many cases, such as that of an elderly Medicaid applicant
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In contrast, other cases have demonstrated the unfairness to
states of invalidating all asset transfer rules. For example, in Lerner
v. Department of Health and Social Services,108 a state court upheld
a Wisconsin transfer of assets rule against a challenge by a single
applicant. While the applicant was a private patient in a con-
valescent center, she transferred to her children commercial prop-
erty with an estimated value of between $40,000 and $89,000.109
Two subsequent applications for benefits were denied. The court
affirmed the denial, stating that
[a]ny interpretation which finds conflict between the fed-
eral statute and the state provision would seem to allow for
extensive abuse of the medical assistance program, since a
failure to require the showing mandated by . . . [the state
statute, that the transfer of property without consideration
was not made in order to receive Medicaid benefits,]
could result in any and every person who meets the in-
come eligibility requirements automatically becoming
eligible for benefits by the simple expedient of giving
away or signing over control of all measurable assets. 110
These case-by-case efforts to resolve the asset transfer issue in
the courts have not provided satisfactory solutions. Rather, they
suffering from senility who has been cajoled out of his assets or actually
defrauded, the presumption can be a cruel and irrational one.
Id. 373.
In another case, Udina v. Walsh, a federal district court invalidated a Missouri
transfer of assets rule on the ground that it conflicted with federal law. 440
F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Mo. 1977). Several applicants were represented. One of
them owned a savings certificate with a value of $9,639. Late in 1974, she re-
deemed it and gave all of the money to her father. Id. 1153. In 1975, her
Medicaid and cash assistance benefits were terminated because she had transferred
the certificate without consideration, despite her ability to prove at an agency
hearing that the money had never been hers-her father had earned it, and it bad
been kept in her name because of "family difficulties." Id. 1154.
108 70 Wis. 2d 670,235 N.W.2d 478 (1975).
109 Id. at 674, 235 N.W.2d at 481.
110 Id. at 680, 235 N.W.2d at 484.
Similarly, in Rinefierd v. Blum, a state court upheld New York's asset transfer
rule against attack by an eighty-seven year-old man who sold his home while he
was in a nursing home, gave the $20,000 in proceeds to his sons, and one year
later applied for Medicaid benefits. 66 A.D.2d 351, 412 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1979).
In upholding the state agency's denial of benefits, the court expressed its concern
about fraud: "Since immediately prior to the time of transfer assets were available,
the fact of transfer coupled with an intent later to file for benefits constitutes a
species of misrepresentation or fraud undertaken for the applicant's benefit at the
expense of the public fisc." Id. at 355, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 529. The court also
recognized New York's interest in preventing abuse of the Medicaid program and
indicated its disbelief that Congress had intended any other result. Id. at 355-56,
412 N.Y.S.2d at 529-30. Enforcement of the statute at issue in Rinefierd was
later enjoined in Caldwell, 621 F.2d 491.
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have left the law in a state of confusion,"' with receipt of benefits
dependent on a court's willingness to enjoin enforcement of state
statutes or regulations. Now that Congress has explicitly authorized
states to impose asset transfer rules,112 each state must outline pre-
cisely a plan that fairly balances the state's valid interests with those
of needy individuals.
III. REINTERPRETING THE STATUTE AND REGULATIONS
Although state asset transfer rules are now authorized ex-
plicitly by federal legislation,1 3 at least two reasons remain to seek
a correct interpretation of the statute and regulations at issue in the
asset transfer cases." 4 First, the new legislation became effective
on March 1, 1981,1"5 and cases brought before that date are still
pending116 These cases will have to be decided by the courts
based on the law as interpreted before the new legislation became
effective. Second, the recent legislation retains the link between
SSI and Medicaid eligibility," 7 but it does not resolve the issue
of "comparability" between SSI and Medicaid beneficiaries. Liti-
gation concerning this issue is likely to continue, therefore, until
either Congress or the Supreme Court makes clear whether "com-
parable" as used in the statute should be interpreted to mean "iden-
tical" or merely "similar."
Whenever the language of a statute is ambiguous, it is appro-
priate to look to the congressional purposes in enacting the legis-
"'Characteristics other than appealing fact patterns also distinguish these
cases. The cases upholding asset transfer rules usually have not been class
actions; generally they have been tried in state courts. See, e.g., Abramson v.
Welfare Conm'r, 31 Conn. Supp. 544, 330 A.2d 822 (1974); Rinefierd, 66 A.D.2d
351, 412 N.Y.S.2d 526; Lerner, 70 Wis. 2d 670, 235 N.W.2d 478. But see Scarpuzza
v. Blum, 73 A.D.2d 237, 426 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1980).
The cases invalidating the rules have generally been tried in federal courts;
often they have been class actions initiated by legal services attorneys. See, e.g.,
Caldwel, 621 F.2d 491; Fabula v. Buck, 598 F.2d 869 (1979). But see Dawson,
622 F.2d 1304.
Nonetheless, because of both the fact patterns and the courts' own recognition
of the fraud/no fraud distinction, that distinction is also a valid basis on which
to distinguish these cases and must be taken into account when states draft
legislation to deal with the transfer of assets problem.
112Soial Security Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 5, 94 Stat.
3567 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382b, 1396a).
13 1d.
114 See notes 60-64 supra & accompanying text.
1 5 See note 147 infra.
116 E.g., Dawson v. Myers, 622 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub noam.
Beltran v. Myers, 101 S. Ct. 353 (1980); Caldwell v. Blum, 621 F.2d 491 (2d
Cir.),petition for cert. fled, 49 U.S.L.W. 3005 (U.S. June 24, 1980) (No. 79-2034).
117 See note 62 supra for text of comparability provision.
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lation.11s The general purpose of the Medicaid program is to
assist the poor in meeting the costs of health care; 119 the specific
purpose of the portion of the program devoted to the medically
needy is to prevent the potential financial catastrophe created by
high medical expenses.' 20 The original congressional intent in en-
acting Medicaid was to provide comprehensive coverage by 1975,121
in terms of both persons eligible and services provided. This intent
was modified, however, by the 1972 amendments to the statute,
which "reflect congressional concern for state fiscal interests." 122
The language of the Medicaid statute's comparability 123 and
availability 124 provisions, at issue in the asset transfer cases, also
has been changed '2 somewhat since the Medicaid program was
established in 1965. There is nothing in the legislative history,
however, to suggest that the intent underlying either provision has
changed. 26  The legislative history of the comparability provision
indicates that it was intended to assure comparability between the
118 United States v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 345 U.S. 295, 315 (1953). See
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979); 2A J.
SUTRIND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.02 (4th ed. C. Sands
1973).
119 See, e.g., Note, Medicare and Medicaid: The Failure of the Present Health
Care System for the Elderly, 17 Aiuz. L. REv. 522 (1975).
12 0 Butler, The Medicaid Program: Current Statutory Requirements and Judicial
Interpretations, 8 CLEAmNGHOUSE REv. 7, 9-10 (1974). See also S. Rm'. No.
404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 11965] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1943.
1
2 1 The statute provided:
The Secretary shall not make payments under the preceding pro-
visions of this section to any State unless the State makes a satisfactory
showing that it is making efforts in the direction of broadening the scope
of the care and services made available under the plan and in the direction
of liberalizing the eligibility requirements for medical assistance, with a
view toward furnishing by July 1, 1975, comprehensive care and services
to substantially all individuals who meet the plan's eligibility standards
with respect to income and resources, including services to enable such
individuals to attain or retain independence or self-care.
Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 1903(e), 79 Stat. 286
(repealed 1972).
122 Section 1903(e) of the original Medicaid statute, see note 121 supra, was
repealed in 1972. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 230,
86 Stat. 1329 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(e) (1976)). See Note, State
Restrictions on Medicaid Coverage of Medically Needy Services, 78 CoLum. L.
REv. 1491, 1495 (1978).
12342 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i) (1976). See note 62 supra.
124 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(B) (1976). Seenote 63supra.
1
2
5 Act of Dec. 31, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-233, §§ 13(a)(3), (7), 87 Stat. 947
(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10), (17) (1976)).
126 Se H.R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19721 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4989 (discussion of the amendments creating the SSI programs);
H.R. REP. No. 627, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. Nmws 3177 (discussion of the amendments making changes in the comparability
and availability provisions).
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various groups of medically needy individuals covered by the stat-
ute.2 7 The history of the availability provision shows that it was
intended to prevent relatives (other than spouses, or parents of
minor or disabled children) from being required to contribute to
the medical expenses of a family member. As the Senate report
accompanying the original act states:
These provisions are designed so that the States will not
assume the availability of income which may not, in fact,
be available or overevaluate income and resources which
are available. Examples of income assumed include sup-
port orders from absent fathers, which have not been paid
or contributions from relatives which are not in reality
received by the needy individual. 28
Because the Dawson v. Myers'2 9 court was correct in its ob-
servation that the HHS subsection 401(c) regulation, so hotly con-
tested in these cases, 30 pertains to general eligibility requirements
and not directly to financial eligibility requirements,131 it becomes
important to examine the regulation dealing directly with medically
needy financial eligibility. 32  That regulation establishes that a
state agency determining Medicaid eligibility must, "[flor aged,
blind, or disabled individuals in States covering all SSI recipients,
deduct the value of resources that would be deducted in determin-
ing eligibility under SSI." 133
The resources to be deducted in determining SSI eligibility
may be found in another set of HHS regulations.'3 Excludable
resources include an applicant's home, household goods, automobile,
property essential to self support, and life insurance up to a face
value of $1,500.13 5 Under the statute and regulations in effect when
12 7 See note 68 supra.
128 S. REP. No. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 78, reprinted in [1965] U.S. CODE
CoNe. & AD. NEws 1943, 2018.
129 622 F.2d 1304.
130 42 C.F.B. § 435.401(c) (1979). See note 64 supra.
131 See text accompanying notes 82 & 83 supra.
13242 C.F.R. § 435.845 (1979); 45 Fed. Reg. 24,886 (1980) (to be codified in
42 C.F.R. § 435.845(e)).
1342 C.F.R. § 435.845(d) (1979) (emphasis added). States have an option,
under 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(f) (1976), to use requirements more restrictive than
SSI in their Medicaid programs. States choosing this option are the so-called
"209(b)" states. See notes 25 & 43 supra. For an explanation why the reasoning
in cases like Fabula v. Buck, 598 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1979), and Caldwell, 621
F.2d 491, is not applicable to 209(b) states, see Drogolewicz v. Quern, 74 IIl.
App. 3d 862, 867, 393 N.E.2d 1212, 1216-17 (1979).
134 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1210-.1237 (1980).
= Id.
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Dawson was decided,1 36 resources that exceeded these limitations
could be disposed of prior to application for benefits without any
effect on SSI eligibility.1 37 Excess resources held by the SSI appli-
cant at the time of application, however, could not be disregarded
in determining the eligibility of an SSI applicant.
13
A reasonable resolution of the asset transfer issue, therefore,
would be the invalidation 3 9 of a state's asset transfer rule only to
the extent that it applies to assets, such as a home or car, that would
have been deducted in determining eligibility for SSI benefits. This
interpretation would reverse the results reached by the courts in
both Dawson and Caldwell v. Blum. It would also prevent the
transfer of assets, such as valuable commercial property, 40 that can
reasonably be expected to help defray the cost of medical care. At
the same time, this interpretation allows the states to provide bene-
fits to truly needy applicants who, voluntarily' 4 ' or through
fraudulent inducement, 42 transfer more personal assets.
In view of the legislative history of the comparability provi-
sion,143 it is uncertain whether Congress intended even this degree
of comparability between SSI and Medicaid recipients. Congress
has entrusted the administration of the Medicaid program to HHS,
however, and in the absence of clear indications that the HHS regu-
lations misconstrued the statute, they should stand. 44
136 Congress has since amended the law to restrict asset transfers by SSI ap-
plicants. Social Security Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 5(a), 94 Stat.
3567 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1382b). See text accompanying notes 147-49
infra.
13 7 SocrAL SEcRm Cr. ums MANUAL, supra note 28, at § 12507(a). See text
accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
138 Owners of excess resources who did not dispose of them prior to application
could still receive benefits. The recipient had to agree in writing to dispose of the
excess assets, however, and the payments received during the period of disposal
were considered "overpayments." 20 C.F.R. § 416.1240 (1980). In addition, if an
SSI recipient sold an asset that was deducted in determining eligibility, the pro-
ceeds of the sale could be included in his resources. Soc.AL SEculur CLAIMs
MAN Ar, supra note 28, at § 12508(a)(2).
139 The legislation permitting states to impose asset transfer rules is not retro-
active. See Social Security Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 5(b), 94
Stat. 3567 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a).
140 See text accompanying notes 108-10 supra. All of the plaintiffs in Fabula,
598 F.2d 869, transferred assets that were or would have been excluded in their
eligibility determinations. The Fabula court stated specifically that this distinction
did not affect its decision. Id. 872 n.6. Under the regulations examined in this
Comment, however, the distinction is not an irrelevant one.
141 See, e.g., text accompanying note 107 supra.
142 See, e.g., text accompanying notes 102-06 supra.
343 See note 68 supra.
144 See New York Dep't of Social Seres. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421 (1973)
(quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969)) ("[Tihe
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IV. TnE LEGISLATIE NONSOLUTION
Medically indigent elderly individuals, if defined to include all
those who may freely transfer their assets in order to obtain govern-
ment subsidization of long-term care, are a potentially huge num-
ber of people.145  Congress recently accommodated the states'
concern with preventing abuse of the Medicaid program by au-
thorizing delays in Medicaid eligibility for applicants who transfer
assets. 40 Congress failed, however, to outline rules that would also
provide necessary medical care to the needy.
The Social Security Amendments of 1980, which became effec-
tive on March 1, 1981,147 provide that any asset given away or sold
for less than fair market value within twenty-four months prior to
application for benefits will be included in the applicant's resources
if the asset was disposed of for the purpose of establishing eligibility
for SSI.148 The amount included will be the asset's fair market
value at the time it was transferred, less any compensation received.
"Convincing" evidence that the transfer was made "exclusively"
for some other purpose is required to rebut a statutory presump-
tion that the transfer was made to establish eligibility for SSI
benefits.149
States now are also expressly authorized to deny Medicaid to
an applicant who "would not be eligible for such medical assistance
but for the fact that he disposed of resources for less than fair
market value." 1o State procedures for determining Medicaid eligi-
bility still may be no more restrictive than the federally mandated
SSI procedure, with one exception: if the uncompensated value Ir"
of the asset transferred by an applicant is greater than $12,000,
states may delay eligibility for longer than twenty-four months. In
such cases, the period of ineligibility must "bear a reasonable re-
lationship" to the uncompensated value of the asset transferred.
-52
construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed
unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong...
' 45 See text accompanying notes 32, 33 & 35-37 supra.
148 Social Security Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 5, 94 Stat. 3567
(to be codified in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382b, 1396a).
147 The law provided that the SSI amendment was to become effective with
respect to applications filed "on or after the first day of the first month which begins
at least 60 days after the date of enactnent of this Act." Id. §5(c).
148 Id. § 5(a).
249 Id.
15oId § 5(b).
15, The fair market value of the asset at the time of transfer, less any com-
pensation received. Id. § 5(a).
152 Zd. § 5(b).
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Finally, if an applicant is ineligible for Medicaid solely because of
the SSI rule,153 but would be eligible under the state's asset transfer
rule, the state may apply its own rule in lieu of the SSI rule.154
Unfortunately, Congress did not establish more specific guide-
lines for states to follow in creating their asset transfer rules. The
asset transfer cases illustrate the deficiencies of already existing state
rules; 155 Congress should have scrutinized these cases more carefully
and dealt with at least the most glaring problems. Thoughtful con-
struction of asset transfer rules at the state level, however, can cure
some of the congressional omissions.156
The new legislation does not establish a minimum dollar value
for the asset transfers that will preclude eligibility for Medicaid
benefits. Such a provision would have prevented states from
penalizing individuals who transfer minimal resources. 157 More
importantly, however, the legislation fails to address the problem of
an interminable eligibility delay.158 For asset transfers whose un-
compensated value exceeds $12,000, the legislation places no limit
on the period of time during which states may delay eligibility.
It merely demands that a period of ineligibility exceeding twenty-
four months "bear a reasonable relationship" to the uncompensated
value of the asset transferred. 15 9 This loose standard creates a risk
that the length of eligibility delay will be measured against a state's
limited reimbursement rates rather than against the applicant's
medical care needs, 60 leading to inhumane delays. The provision
153 SSI recipients are categorically needy and therefore automatically eligible
for Medicaid in states using SSI eligibility criteria. See note 25 supra & accompany-
ing text. If an SSI applicant is declared ineligible for SSI, he can qualify for
Medicaid only if he is medically needy.
154 Social Security Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 5(b), 94 Stat.
3567 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a).
155 See notes 99-111 supra & accompanying text.
156 Any restrictions established should avoid the punish-the-victim philosophy
that has characterized some efforts to control widespread provider abuse, see M.
MENDELSON, Tzunan LOVING GRE-D (1974), by cutting back on benefits to re-
cipients. An example of such a cutback is discussed in Budnicki v. Beal, 450 F.
Supp. 546 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Pennsylvania attempted to control widespread fraud
and abuse by providers of orthopedic shoes by discontinuing its orthopedic shoe
program rather than by prosecuting unscrupulous providers.).
157 See H.R. REP. No. 1167, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1980). Cf. PA. STAT.
ANx. tit. 62, §441.2 (Purdon Supp. 1980-81) (denying medical assistance to an
individual who transfers assets worth $500 or more without fair consideration).
158This problem was highlighted by Buckner v. Maher, 424 F. Supp. 366 (D.
Conn. 1976), aff'd, 434 U.S. 898 (1977). See text accompanying notes 102-07
supra.
159 Social Security Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 5(b), 94 Stat.
3567 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a).
160 See, e.g., Buckner, 424 F. Supp. at 370 & n.8 (Connecticut statute required'
applicant to "'work off"' the value of the asset transferred according to a standard
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reflects a lack of consideration of the actual costs of long-term care,
which may run as high as $20,000 per year.161 An individual who
transfers assets with an uncompensated value of $14,000 and con-
sumes care costing $20,000 per year thus could be denied benefits
for a period of time much longer than that for which his or her
transferred assets would have paid. Such a practice would be both
illogical and punitive.
Because the legislation gives states some flexibility to fashion
asset transfer policies, 62 states can cure this defect by making the
length of eligibility delay proportionate to the dollar value of the
assets transferred and the actual costs of the care provided. Under
such a rule, a person who transfers assets with an uncompensated
value of $14,000 and consumes health care costing $20,000 per
year would be denied benefits for only about eight and one-half
months, by which time his assets would have been exhausted any-
way. 63
Another flaw in the legislation is the vague standard of "con-
vincing evidence" that must 64 be met to rebut the presumption
that the transfer was made to establish eligibility for Medicaid bene-
fits. Whether this standard requires the use of only "objective"
factors, such as those required by the California regulations,165 or
whether it permits subjective factors, such as intent or lack of knowl-
state formula rather than according to the applicant's needs). Cf. 22 CAL. AD.
CoDE § 50411, quoted in Brief for Appellees at 14 n.5, Dawson v. Myers, 622 F.2d
1304 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nor. Beltran v. Myers, 101 S. Ct. 353 (1980)
("'period of ineligibility may be further reduced by deducting the actual cost to
the applicant or beneficiary for medical expenses incurred!").
11 Brief on Behalf of Appellant at 25, Caldwell v. Blum, 621 F.2d 491 (2d
Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3005 (U.S. June 24, 1980) (No.
79-2034).
162 ,"In the case of medicaid eligibility, the amendment makes explicit the
intent . . . to grant the States more flexibility. The amendment would permit
States to establish disposal of asset disqualification rules for medicaid purposes
which differ in detail from the SSI rule." 126 CoNG. REc. S16,505-06 (daily ed.
Dec. 13, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Long).
183This proposal establishes a more realistic link between the value of the
assets transferred and the cost of care consumed. It permits regional variations in
the length of eligibility delay. In states where long-term care is relatively less
expensive, therefore, the delay could be longer.
164 SSI applicants also must rebut a statutory presumption of forbidden purpose
by proving that the transfer was "exclusively" for some other purpose. Social
Security Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-611, § 5(a), 94 Stat. 3567 (to be
codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1382b). The law provides that state procedures for deter-mining Medicaid eligibility may be no more restrictive than the SSI procedure
(with one exception, see text accompanying notes 151-52 supra). Id. § 5(b).
Presumably, states are free to use a less stringent evidentiary standard, but it is
difficult to identify a less stringent standard because the SSI standard is so poorly
defined.
165 See note 48 supra.
19811
908 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
edge, to be introduced in rebuttal is unclear. If the concern of the
states is to prevent fraud and abuse, subjective factors should be
considered relevant. Subjective factors are particularly important
for individuals who are incapable of making rational decisions con-
cerning the disposition of their property, or who are powerless to
stop the disposition of property in which they have an interest.'66
Creating an automatic exemption from the presumption of for-
bidden purpose when an applicant transfers assets excluded from the
eligibility determination could also cure the statute's vague evi-
dentiary standard.1 7 The states probably will be reluctant to
choose this method, however, because one goal of state asset transfer
rules is to keep even excludable resources in the Medicaid recipient's
possession so that the state may recover the cost of benefits out of
those resources after the recipient dies.168 To discourage asset trans-
fers by Medicaid recipients and to provide a source from which to
recover expenditures, therefore, states may wish to make it difficult
for an applicant to rebut the presumption of forbidden purpose,
even when otherwise excludable resources are transferred. If Con-
gress wished to recognize this state interest in recovering expend-
itures, it should have done so explicitly. Both the states and their
Medicaid applicants then would have notice that such restrictions
on asset transfers are consistent with federal law.
Similarly, Congress should have made clear whether a state's
presumption of forbidden purpose conflicts with federal law. A
reasonable interpretation of the new SSI rule concerning asset
transfers 169 is that a transfer of excludable resources 170 cannot give
rise to the presumption of purpose to qualify for benefits because,
by definition, excludable resources do not affect eligibility. If HHS
chooses this interpretation to implement the statute, but states
choose to presume that any transfer of assets is made in order to
establish eligibility, then more litigation over the still unresolved
issue of "comparability" between SSI and Medicaid beneficiaries 171
is likely to arise. Hence, this deficiency in the legislation may result
in delay or denial of benefits to elderly medically indigent indi-
viduals having neither the time nor the money for protracted
litigation.
166 See text accompanying notes 2-4 supra.
167 For example, an applicant's home or car could be excluded. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.1210-.1237 (1980).
168 See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SEav. LAw §366(1)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1980-81).
169 See text accompanying notes 147-49 supra.
170 See text accompanying note 135 supra.
17
1 See note 62 supra & accompanying text.
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Other legislation introduced to, but not enacted by, the 96th
Congress would have authorized states to recover the cost of bene-
fits from a transferee up to the uncompensated value of the prop-
erty he or she has received.172 The legislative history accompany-
ing that provision, explicitly recognizing the possibility that elderly
individuals may be victimized by those to whom they transfer re-
sources, 173 declared that states should not "penalize individuals that
have been subject to such exploitation by delaying their eligibility
for medicaid." 174 States should remember this possibility of ex-
ploitation when they write their transfer of assets rules. They also
should keep in mind individuals, such as Mr. Manahan,175 who lack
any real control over the distribution of assets in which they may
have a legal interest. State rules should give limited discretion to
appropriate social services officials to reduce -or waive eligibility
delay' 76 when a delay would unreasonably or unfairly deny needed
Medicaid benefits.
Finally, states will have to supply certain procedural details
omitted from the federal statute in order to have a workable plan.'"7
A forum must be established to hear evidence concerning the pur-
pose of the applicant's transfer of assets. There must also be a
'72 H.R. 7765, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. §333(a)(2) (1980). The legislative
history accompanying the provision indicates an intent that states would use "ap-
propriate State judicial procedures to assure due process to a transferee." H.R.
REP. No. 1167, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1980). No actions for recovery could
have been initiated later than three years after the end of the transferor's in-
eligibility period. The amount of recovery would have been limited by the "lesser
of the uncompensated value [of the transferred asset] or the cost of the medical
assistance provided to the transferor during or after the period the transferor was
(or could have been) determined to be ineligible." Id.
Such safeguards may not eliminate all potential constitutional objections by
transferees if states do attempt to recover from them. However, such a recovery
could be considered analogous to the federal estate tax imposed on gifts made in
contemplation of death. See I.R.C. § 2035.
173 H.R. rP. No. 1167, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1980). This sort of victim-
ization of the elderly has been recognized by the courts as well. In Moran v.
Lascaris, the court discussed the sale of an elderly woman's home by her son while
she was in a nursing home. 61 A.D.2d 405, 402 N.Y.S.2d 486 (1978). There
was no evidence that she was aware of her son's action, but the sale resulted in
the termination of the woman's Medicaid benefits by the state agency. The court
reversed the termination.
174 H.R. REP. No. 1167, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1980).
176 See text accompanying notes 2-4 &upra.
176See H.R. 7765, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. §333(a)(2) (1980), which would
have permitted states to reduce or waive a period of ineligibility if such action was
"justified:'
'77 State procedures for determining Medicaid eligibility can be no more re-
strictive than SSI procedures. Social Security Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-611, § 5(b), 94 Stat. 3567 (to be codified in 42 U.S.C. § 1396a). State pro-
cedures, therefore, will have to comply with whatever regulations H1-IS promulgates
to implement the statute.
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mechanism for administrative appeal and/or judicial review in the
event an application is denied. Whatever procedures are estab-
lished must be efficient and expeditious. Time is of the essence
because the elderly applicant often will have little time to wait.
CONCLUSION
Many elderly people require long-term institutional care today
and will continue to require such care in the future. This care
often replaces home living and becomes a permanent arrangement.
Forbidding all asset transfer rules could gradually convert the Medi-
caid program, designed to provide health care to the poor, into a
long-term care subsidy for persons with moderate or substantial
assets. Such a result could encourage states to terminate assistance
to the medically needy altogether.
This Comment has analyzed recent cases dealing with transfer
of assets rules, proposing an alternative resolution that strikes a
fairer balance between the interests of the states and the needs of
individuals. It also has examined and criticized recent legislation
that permits states to impose asset transfer rules, suggesting ele-
ments that states should incorporate in their rules to assure that
Medicaid abuse may be prevented, without destroying the original
congressional objective of providing medical assistance to the needy.
[NOTE: After this Comment had gone to press, the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Beltran v. Myers, 49 U.S.L.W. 4534 (U.S. May 18, 1981).
The Court vacated the decision of the Ninth Circuit and remanded the case for
reconsideration in light of the legislation discussed in this Comment.)
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